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Relying on constitutional text, history, and the theorem for which
Ronald Coase won the Nobel Prize,1 I argued in this Journal that Con-
gress should formally declare war when authorizing the use of military
force on the scale of the Persian Gulf War.2 Professor Harold Hongju
Koh of the Yale Law School replied that my "ill-advised ambition to
marry constitutional originalism with law-and-economics should be
killed before it spreads."' 3 Although flattered to play Salman Rushdie to
Koh's Ayatollah, I suggest that the professor call off the jihad.
I agree that "the Constitution no more enacts the Coase Theorem
than it does Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."'4 That does not mean,
however, that economics cannot illuminate the compelling logic of the
Framers' design. Far from arguing that the Framers "enacted" as a mat-
ter of original intent what we now call the Coase Theorem, I offered a
normative interpretation of the War Clause that built upon a positive
economic analysis of the separation of powers.
Coase observed that in the absence of transaction costs, the ultimate
use of a resource will be determined not by the initial assignment of prop-
erty rights between two parties, but rather by which of the two parties
can put the resource to its highest-valued use, and thus will have the
means and incentive to induce the other party to exchange his rights to
that resource. Normatively, the Coase Theorem implies that legal rules
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should facilitate such bargaining by reducing transaction costs.5 How-
ever, as James Buchanan has argued, when the Theorem is extended to a
theory of the state, "new and previously nonexistent 'rights of decision'
are brought into being, rights that have economic value that is potentially
capturable by the subset of the citizenry empowered to make decisions on
behalf of all." 6 Monitoring the officials who exercise rights of decision is
costly. The diverse output of government is not amenable to expression
in a few statistics (as are the profitability and risk of a public corporation,
for example), and, as presentment shows, many government decisions are
joint products of several agents in separate branches-a distribution of
responsibilities that invites shirking.7
Monitoring costs are reduced, and political accountability enhanced,
by prohibiting bargains that alter the Constitution's formal allocation of
rights of decision among political actors.8 One might describe this prop-
osition as the "Inverse Coase Theorem." Koh apparently has misunder-
stood my basic point; he claims that constitutional controversies cannot
satisfy the Coase Theorem's underlying assumptions. 9 If only this were
true, I would be the last to complain. It would be desirable if an absence
of necessary conditions in addition to zero transaction costs thwarted the
reallocation of rights of decision. 10 But obviously the executive and legis-
lative branches do make bargains that reallocate constitutional rights of
5. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 101 (1988); Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982).
6. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 397 (Robert
D. Tollison & Viktor J. Vanberg eds., 1989).
7. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 779-81 (1972); Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the
Delegation of Legislative Authority, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175, 179
(Roger Noll ed., 1985).
8. Such rights are inalienable so that their holder may not "sell them or... exploit his posses-
sion of them through collection of personal rewards, either directly or indirectly," and this inaliena-
bility "clearly makes the [Coase] theorem of allocational neutrality invalid." BUCHANAN, supra
note 6, at 398.
9. See Koh, supra note 3, at 129.
10. Only if I were arguing that bargains between the branches should occur would I need to ask
when they can occur. See id at 129-30 nn.39 & 40 (citing Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982); Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986)).
Koh also states that "analogizing constitutional powers to 'property rights' oversimplifies to the
point of distortion" because "separation of powers principles do not draw sharp boundaries between
congressional and presidential authorities in foreign affairs." Koh, supra note 3, at 130. One could
say the same about the use of the air by one party to dry laundry and by another to dispose of sooty
exhaust. Why should it be harder to define the war powers (and duties) of the President and Con-
gress than to define property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum (which Coase was studying
when he had the insight for The Problem of Social Cost, see Coase, supra note 1, at 1 n.l (discussing
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959)))? For a more
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decision. Curiously, after Koh says that this practice is impossible, he
lauds the occasions where it does happen-an interesting position in that
it is both empirically false and logically self-contradictory.' Koh's hy-
pothetical, in which the President's trespassing cattle damage Congress's
crops, also shows how he has missed my point.12 My point is that there
are agency costs associated with some kinds of cooperative behavior be-
tween the branches. If the President (ranch manager) and the Congress
(farm manager) were mutually to agree to share something that belonged
to the People (landowner), then the hypothetical would be relevant. In
the Persian Gulf War, Congress and the President mutually agreed to
ignore the constitutionally required formality of declaring war when in
fact initiating full-scale offensive war, all to the detriment of the princi-
pal-"We the People"-of whom both the President and Congress are
supposed to be agents.
If the branches do trade rights of decision, it becomes more difficult
for a citizen to know which branch is responsible for a particular deci-
sion. He therefore incurs higher cost in petitioning government. More-
over, the locus of a decision can alter the decision itself. Such factors as
the different discount rates for assessing policy options implied by the
critical analysis of the limits of analogizing the separation of powers to property rights, see Geoffrey
P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 196, 201-05 (1991).
11. Koh asserts: "To argue that Congress may only approve war by formal declaration makes
about as much sense these days as a claim the Congress may only approve an international commit-
ment by a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the Senate," because an executive agreement approved by
joint resolution "has become viewed as effectively interchangeable with an Article II treaty for forg-
ing our international commitments." Koh, supra note 3, at 126 & n.24. Far from supporting Koh's
position, this example demonstrates why the inalienability of rights of decision matters.
Calling a treaty a congressional-executive agreement could produce a different decision--either
because it would disable one-third plus one members of the Senate from vetoing a treaty, or because
Congress may usurp the President's control of the agenda in the treaty-making process by negotiat-
ing a treaty and then overriding the President's veto of the joint resolution enacting it as an interna-
tional agreement.
With respect to the second possibility, although a congressional-executive agreement suppos-
edly "can be concluded only by the President, who alone possesses the constitutional power to nego-
tiate with other governments," that rule is violated if the agreement can substitute for a treaty "in
every instance." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987) (emphasis added). In 1987, for example, Speaker of the House Jim
Wright discussed arms reductions directly with Mikhail Gorbachev. See J. Gregory Sidak, The
President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1212; see also Statement on Signing the De-
partments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1992, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1529 (Oct. 28, 1991) ("The Constitution ... vests exclu-
sive authority in the President to control the timing and substance of negotiations with foreign gov-
ernments and to choose the officials who will negotiate on behalf of the United States.").
Rather than explain why we should no longer care about the President's control over treaties
and the prerogative of a minority of the Senate to veto them, Koh cites the Necessary and Proper
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, as if it empowers Congress to strike outmoded words from the
Constitution. See Koh, supra note 3, at 126-27.
12. See Koh, supra note 3, at 131.
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differing tenure of judges, senators, presidents, and representatives; the
different constituencies represented through different modes of election
for each branch (and each house of Congress); the different degrees to
which vote cycling is implied by the different methods of agenda control
in the three branches; and the influence on the speed and secrecy of deci-
sions caused by the relative unity or plurality of the decision process, can
all affect the content of a particular decision.
Nonetheless, Koh views the phrase "To declare War" as outmoded.
Although the United States and its allies killed as many as 150,000 Iraqi
soldiers during the six-week Persian Gulf War, 13 Koh calls it "nothing
less than bizarre" and an instance of "mindless originalism" to insist that
lethal force of such magnitude must be authorized by the declaration of
war for which the Constitution expressly provides.1 4 He urges that "for-
mal declarations of war [be] left to their special historical place." 15 What
that place is, and how killing 25,000 persons per week is an illustration of
Congress using the "scalpel" of a limited authorization of war rather
than the "meat cleaver" of a formal declaration of war,16 are questions
that Koh does not attempt to answer.
13. See Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Death TollRemains Clouded, WASH. POST, June 23, 1991, at Al,
A17 (reporting Defense Intelligence Agency estimates).
14. See Koh, supra note 3, at 127, 128.
15. Id. at 132.
16. See id. at 128.
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